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Welfare Reform 
in Agricultural California 
Richard Green, Philip Martin, 
and J. Edward Taylor 
When welfare reforms were enacted in  1996, a higher than average percentage of 
residents in the agricultural heartland of California, the San Joaquin Valley, 
received cash assistance. Average annual unemployment rates during the 1990s 
ranged from 12% to 20%, and 15% to 20% of  residents in major farming counties 
received cash benefits. This analysis develops and estimates a two-equation cross- 
sectionally correlated and timewise autoregressive model to test the hypothesis that 
in agricultural areas, seasonal work, low earnings, and high unemployment, as  well 
as few entry-level jobs that offer wages and benefits equivalent to welfare benefits, 
promote welfare use and limit the potential of  local labor markets to absorb ex- 
welfare recipients. 
Key words: cross-sectionally correlated and timewise autoregressive model, farm 
workers, immigration, welfare reform 
Introduction 
The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of  1996 (PL 104- 
193,  PRWORA) required states  to move able-bodied adults  receiving cash assistance  into 
employment after two years, and limited most able-bodied adults to a "lifetime" five years 
of cash assistance. PRWORAsingled out immigrants for additional restrictions: most legal 
immigrants arriving after August 22,1996, are  not eligible for federal welfare assistance 
until they have been in the United States at  least five years, and many legal immigrants 
receiving assistance when PRWORA was enacted lost their eligibility for benefits.' 
California's agricultural heartland provides a unique test of  the feasibility of  the 
PRWORA work-first approach to welfare. The San  Joaquin Valley includes a farm work 
force that is more than 95% immigrant, has unemployment rates which ranged from 
12-20% in the 1990s, and includes counties with some of the highest welfare-use rates 
in  the United States-15%  to 20% of residents of major agricultural counties were 
receiving cash welfare benefits in the mid-1990s (Nyberg). 
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This study utilizes a unique longitudinal database and simultaneous-equation tech- 
niques to test the hypothesis that a lack of well-paid jobs with benefits in California's 
major agricultural counties promotes welfare use and limits the potential of local labor 
markets to gainfully absorb ex-welfare  recipients. The corollary of this  hypothesis is  that 
policies limiting adult access to welfare either will reduce the incomes of  poor rural 
households or will induce rural welfare recipients to leave agricultural areas in order 
to maintain their incomes. Our findings question the  assumption underlying the  federal 
welfare reform that there should be a one-size-fits-all  welfare policy. The two- and five- 
year PRWORA limits on cash benefits may have to be adjusted for agricultural areas 
with large numbers of seasonal farm jobs. 
U.S. Welfare Reforms and Expectations 
The 1996 welfare reforms mark a watershed in social policy. PRWORA ended welfare 
as  a federal entitlement, replacing the 61-year-old Aid to Families with Dependent 
Children (AFDC) program with the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TAW) 
program. Even though socioeconomic conditions differ significantly throughout the 
United States, all residents are subject to the two- and five-year limits on federal cash 
assistance. 
In  California, PRWORA was implemented through the California Work Opportunity 
and Responsibility to Kids Program (CalWORKS), which went into effect January 1, 
1998. Under CalWORKS, individual adult recipients of cash assistance are required to 
sign welfare-to-work contracts spelling out the requirements imposed by county coun- 
selors to engage in job search activities, or to obtain supportive services that make the 
recipient employable (Herman,  Reardon, and Steinberg; Haider et al.; Nyberg). There 
are sanctions on individuals who refuse to work, as well as on counties and the state if 
too few adults are  working within specified time periods. In 1996,  the  percentage of resi- 
dents receiving welfare assistance in California's 58 counties ranged from 1.6%  in  Marin 
County to 18%  in Merced County, and the average annual unemployment rate ranged 
from 3% in Marin County to 16%  in Tulare County (Nyberg). 
The theory underlying welfare reform is  that  requiring adults to work generates 
wages for them and reduces the  cost ofwelfare assistance  to taxpayers. Work experience 
and supportive services, in turn, can increase human capital, and thus the ability of ex- 
recipients to sustain themselves without assistance. Implementing a welfare-to-work 
strategy requires: (a)  local jobs offering wages high enough to make earners ineligible 
or unwilling to apply for welfare benefits, or (b)  recipients willing to migrate to where 
such jobs are available. 
The number of persons receiving cash assistance in the  United States  peaked at  14.4 
million in March 1994, and fell to 5.8 million in June  2000, a decrease of 60%. According 
to estimates of the President's Council of Economic Advisers, most of the decline before 
1996 was due to economic and  job growth and increases in minimum wages; the  federal 
minimum wage rose from $4.25 an hour in 1993 to $4.75 in 1996, and $5.15 in 1997. 
One-third of the decline in the caseload after 1996 was attributed to new welfare rules 
and regulations, and  perhaps 10%  to continued labor market improvements (President's 
Council of Economic Advisers). 
In a comprehensive review of welfare reform studies, Schoeni and Blank found about 
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to improved labor market conditions;  thus, welfare policy changes "reduced public assist- 
ance participation and increased family earnings." However, Schoeni and Blank went 
on to conclude, "the 1996 reforms had little additional impact on work behaviorn- 
largely because early 1990s federal waivers, which gave states such as  Wisconsin the 
freedom to change welfare policies, had more measurable impacts than post-1996 
changes (Schoeni and Blank; Ziliak et al.).' 
Most studies of the  impacts of welfare reform examine changes in caseloads or in the 
work and well-being of ex-recipients at  the national or state level. They do not test for 
differences in caseload between agricultural and  nonagricultural counties or for a struc- 
tural relationship between employment and welfare. California's experience suggests 
both may be critical. The number of persons receiving cash assistance in California 
peaked at  2.7 million in 1995, and fell to 1.3 million in June 2000, a decrease of 52%. 
The slower decline in recipients in California than in the rest of the United States has 
been attributed to an unemployment rate remaining above the U.S. average rate and 
to persistent poverty and  welfare dependence in agricultural counties. As a result, Cali- 
fornia's share of U.S. welfare recipients rose from 17% in 1993 to 22% in 2000 (Rural 
Migration News). 
PRWORA was widely expected to have different effects in rural and urban areas. High 
and  seasonally  fluctuating  unemployment rates were expected to  keep welfare dependency 
higher than average in rural areas, unless persons who depended on a mix of earnings, 
unemployment insurance, and welfare assistance found stable local jobs or moved from 
such areas. In the mid-1990s, about 60% of the U.S. counties with the  highest percent- 
age of residents receiving cash assistance also had higher than average unemployment 
rates, and  welfare assistance rates were not expected to drop in these counties until the 
national unemployment rate fell. Even if they found jobs, low-wage rural workers were 
less likely to earn their way out of poverty than low-wage urban workers (Dyson; Findeis 
and  Jensen; Goetz and Freshwater; Jensen and Chitose). It  should be emphasized, here 
and in the remainder of this article, we use the term "agricultural" rather than "rural," 
because most of  California's major agricultural counties are classified as "metro" or 
"urban." 
Labor and  Welfare  in Agricultural California 
Many of the factors expected to make it  difficult to move adults from welfare to work are 
present in the agricultural counties of California. California has led the nation in farm 
sales since 1950;  its  $27 billion in farm sales in 1998  represented 13%  of U.S. farm sales 
(California Department of Food and Agriculture). About half of California's farm sales 
represent fruit and nut, vegetable and melon, and horticultural specialty crops such as 
mushrooms and  nursery products. The production of these crops depends  on hired 
workers, most of whom are immigrants who are employed seasonally. 
Agriculture has been a port of  entry for immigrants with little education for over a 
century, and over 80% of the seasonal farm workers in California are immigrants from 
rural Mexico with less than six years schooling. While most of these immigrants do not 
receive cash welfare assistance,  in part because they often are  not eligible,  their children 
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born in the United States are U.S. citizens, and therefore usually eligible for welfare 
benefits. 
Second-generation children of  seasonal workers who are educated in the United States 
tend to leave farming counties for urban counties, where wages and prospects for upward 
mobility are better. In contrast, second-generation  children who lack the education and 
motivation to succeed in urban counties frequently remain in agricultural areas. How- 
ever, they are often unwilling to follow their parents into the fields, yet are unable to 
find  jobs that provide earnings and benefits which exceed welfare benefits-xplaining 
why employment rates can be similar between agricultural and other counties while 
welfare rates are significantly different. 
The above background discussion helps to clarify why the responses to welfare reform 
can be expected to differ between agricultural and urban areas. Specifically, the following 
important factors should be noted: 
Compared to the State of  California as a whole, the welfare-reform starting point 
for its agricultural counties was different. In 1995,8%  of  California residents, but 
15%  to 20% of  residents in some agricultural countries, received cash assistance 
(Nyberg). 
Recipients in farming counties often face higher hurdles to achieving stable employ- 
ment due to (a)  their personal characteristics (e.g., a high percentage of recipients 
in the mid-1990s were not high school graduates, lacked English or other skills, or 
lacked transportation), and (b)  the nature of  the economies in which they live (e.g., 
higher unemployment  rates, more seasonality,  and  fewerjobs offering benefits such 
as health insurance). 
There are  fewer opportunities for economies of scale or experiments involving com- 
petition between public and private providers of  services that help recipients get 
off and stay off welfare in rural areas, which tend to have relatively few recipients 
and a high percentage of recipients with very specific needs, including relatives of 
incarcerated persons, Native Americans, and refugees. 
California's eight-county San Joaquin Valley provides an example of  the welfare-to- 
work challenge in agricultural areas. The San Joaquin Valley is the nation's leading 
farm area. Its $14.5 billion in farm sales in 1998 would rank it as the third largest farm 
"state" in the nation, after California and Texas. However, the San Joaquin Valley's  per 
capita personal income of  $18,658 a year would rank it 49th among states; in constant 
dollars, per capita income in the Valley fell in the 1990s. Furthermore, the gap between 
earnings in the San Joaquin Valley and the rest of the state  has been widening. In 1969, 
average annual earnings were $3,600 in Fresno and $4,700 in San Jose; in 1997, the 
respective earnings were $19,000 and $38,000 (Nyberg). 
The San Joaquin Valley has 3.3 million residents, representing 10%  of  California's 
population, and its  population has been increasing by 90,000 a year. Based on this 
trend, the population is projected to reach 4.3 million by 2010. San  Joaquin Valley 
residents are 53% non-Hispanic white, 34% Hispanic, and 8%  Asian. Only about 66% 
of  the adults are high school graduates, and 14%  have college degrees (Nyberg). 
The San Joaquin Valley unemployment rate averaged 13%  in 1998, meaning an 
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unemployed. To put this unemployment in perspective, the state of Iowa and the eight- 
county San  Joaquin Valley each have labor forces of  about 1.5 million persons. In 
November 1999, Iowa had 31,000 unemployed workers; the San  Joaquin Valley had 
160,000.  Competition for nonfarm  jobs offering more than minimum wages and benefits 
in the San Joaquin Valley can be intense. For example, in the fall of 1999,  when a local 
casino advertised 80  jobs, 566 people applied, and when food distributor Fleming Foods 
advertised 100  jobs, 850 applied (Rural Migration News). 
Seasonal employment for farm workers (who comprise 15-25% of all workers in San 
Joaquin Valley counties) and high unemployment rates raise a fundamental question: 
Will San Joaquin Valley adults expected to move from welfare to work-about  half of 
whom do not have a high school diploma-be  able to find jobs that provide earnings and 
benefits equivalent to cash and related welfare assistance? If not, the welfare-to-work 
challenge is likely to be different in the San Joaquin Valley than in Midwestern states 
such as Iowa. In Iowa, welfare recipients can be attracted by low unemployment into 
vacant jobs, while in the San  Joaquin Valley, those leaving welfare assistance are more 
likely to be pushed by the  threat of sanctions into the  labor force, because there are 
relatively few vacant jobs offering wages and benefits equivalent to the  welfare benefits 
package. 
Theoretical Considerations 
Individuals apply for welfare assistance, and county staff determine their eligibility for 
cash assistance and other benefits. Thus, a utility-maximizing individual "chooses" to 
apply for welfare assistance if the  expected value of benefits exceeds wages and benefits 
that could be earned by working. Individuals currently receiving cash assistance can 
respond to time limits in four ways: (a)  find employment, (b)  seek employment but be 
unemployed, (c)  migrate from the area, or (d)  shift from welfare assistance to being out 
of the labor force, i.e., not receiving cash assistance or seeking employment. 
Data on individuals applying for and receiving welfare assistance are confidential. 
Thus, most welfare-related research relies on a combination of administrative data,  such 
as caseloads, and survey data, such as  from the monthly "Current Population Survey" 
(CPS) (US. Department of Labor, Bureau of  Labor Statistics), to examine how broad 
groups of recipients or ex-recipients are  faring.3  For example, using CPS data, Katz and 
Murphy examined relative wage changes between groups of workers categorized by sex, 
education, and experience  from 1963  to 1987.  They used an  aggregate production function 
to derive the demand for various types of labor and assumed, in a partial equilibrium 
framework, these groups of workers are imperfect substitutes, so that changes in rela- 
tive wages reflect shifts in labor supply and demand. 
Because data are  not available for individuals, we use county-level data  on caseloads, 
unemployment, and other indicators affecting whether individuals choose to apply for 
welfare benefits. Our basic hypothesis is that the  probability of receiving welfare assist- 
ance is associated with higher unemployment. County unemployment at  time t is the 
difference between total labor supply (S,),  and labor demand (D,).  The labor demand 
function is derived from profit maximization subject to an  aggregate production 
function, i.e.: 
The March "Current Population Survey" has  a supplement that provides information on earnings and weeks worked in 
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(1) 
where Qt andp, represent output and output price at  time t, Kt is capital, r, is the price 
of capital, w, is the prevailing wage, and <  is a vector of  parameters influencing the 
productivity of labor and capital. Capital is assumed to be fixed in  the short run. Solution 
to this profit-maximization problem yields an aggregate labor demand function of the 
form D(w,, z:),  where z:  includes <  and all nonwage  price^.^ 
The labor supply is  derived from constrained utility maximization for a representative 
or average household: 
where C, denotes consumption (with price normalized to I),  st  is  household labor supply, 
@(st)  s st  denotes actual time employed, T is the time endowment, and zs is a vector of 
supply-side shifiers; we, is welfare income, and zr  denotes rules determining individ- 
uals' eligibility for welfare given wages and employment. 
The solution to this  utility-maximization problem aggregated across households gives 
a labor supply function of the form S(w,, zs, we,). Substituting  for we,, county aggregate 
unemployment at  any given time t can be represented as 
or alternatively as a rate, 
where TLF, is  the size ofthe total county labor force at  time t. In the econometric analysis 
below, we use the county employment rate, 
DSW 
E, =  1 - Ilr(wt9 Zt 9  Zt ,  Zt  ) 
TLF, 
Specifically, the employment rate depends upon variables affecting the supply and 
demand of labor, including welfare eligibility. 
Welfare demand is endogenous in (2). It depends not on labor supply, but rather, on 
actual employment, wages, and welfare eligibility. Given labor supply, employment 
depends on the probability of finding work in a given labor market. Using the 
employment rate as a proxy for this probability and summing-up across households, 
total county welfare income is modeled as: W,  = W(E,, w,, 27).  Employment and welfare 
demand must be estimated jointly, using simultaneous equation techniques. Welfare 
Alternatively, aggregate county employment may be viewed as the sum of employment across  representative firms with 
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reform substantially reduced eligibility for benefits, shifting Wt  downward. In empirical 
work, welfare reform is represented by a dummy variable in the vector zF. 
Prevailing wages are not available on a monthly basis by county. However, in agri- 
cultural areas of California, the entry-level wage is institutionally determined by the 
minimum wage. The employment prospects for individuals who leave welfare depend 
on the demand and supply of similar workers at  this minimum wage. In the econometric 
analysis, we assume the employment rate is determined by the supply and demand 
shiRers (which  include welfare income influencing  labor supply) and the minimum wage. 
The number of county welfare recipients is used as a proxy for welfare demand. To pre- 
serve the triangularity of the equation system (see below), welfare demand is  represented 
in reduced form in the  employment equation (see the text equation for E,, above). There- 
fore, all exogenous variables affecting welfare appear in the employment equation. 
Estimation 
The key hypothesis of this analysis is that  welfare demand and unemployment are  higher, 
ceteris paribus, in agricultural than in other areas, resultingin a rural ''welfare-to-work 
gap." The econometric model estimated to test this hypothesis is a two-equation cross- 
sectionally and timewise autoregressive system of  equations, and the unit of  analysis 
is counties, denoted by subscript i. Reliance on aggregate county data instead of data on 
individual firms and households introduces heteroskedasticity which must be accounted 
for in the estimation procedure. The employment equation is specified as: 
where the dependent variable, E,,  represents the employment rate for county i in time 
period t. The right-hand-side  variables include demand and supply shifters and the  min- 
imum wage (z:,  z:,  and MW,, respectively). The variable TLFt denotes the total labor 
force. In California, counties with larger populations and labor forces tend to have the 
lowest unemployment rates, while smaller agricultural and nonagricultural counties 
have relatively high unemployment rates, reflecting smaller and more specialized econ- 
omies. The size of the labor force is included in the employment equation to control for 
scale. The variable HSD, represents the high school dropout rate. 
In addition to these county-specific variables, the  employment equation includes 
quarterly dummies for quarters 2, 3, and 4 (DQ2,, DQ3,, and DQ4,, respectively)5 to 
control for seasonality of labor demand; the minimum wage rate, MW,; and the  number 
of apprehensions of illegal immigrants at  time t, APP,. The agricultural region dummy 
variable, SJV,, equals one if county i is among the eight counties making up the San 
Joaquin Valley and zero ~thenvise.~  The San  Joaquin Valley dummy variable acts as a 
5These  represent the high (summer),  low (winter),  and intermediate (fall,  spring)  labor-demand seasons. Experimentation 
with monthly dummies yielded qualitatively similar results. 
The eight San  Joaquin Valley counties are: F'resno, Kern, Kings, Madera, Merced, Stanislaus, Tulare, and San Joaquin. 
We also employed a dummy  variable for the CentralValley counties and California's 15  leading agricultural counties  by gross 
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proxy for the total farm labor force in each county, because the latter variable was not 
available for numerous counties.'  Ideally, one would want to estimate the employment 
equation separately by worker skill level; however, monthly employment data are not 
available by skill level. 
A policy dummy variable, PD,, is equal to zero before January 1996, and one after 
January 1996,  the  year welfare reforms were enacted. PRWORA went into effect in Cali- 
fornia via the  CalWORKS program in January 1998,  but the  impact of the reforms took 
effect when welfare reforms were enaded in 1996. County total population is represented 
by POP,,, the percentage of foreign-born population (immigrants) in county i is repre- 
sented by FOR,,  the percentage of families with children under the age of six years old 
is denoted by CHILD,,  and the percentage of households with elderly members (over 65 
years old) is represented by ELD,.  The employment rate is expected to increase with 
population. The number of persons 25 and  older who did not complete high school is a 
proxy for human capital differences among counties. 
The welfare equation is given by: 
where the endogenous variables are the total number of adult recipients of cash assist- 
ance under AFDCITANF (Kt)  and the employment rate (E,)  in the ith county at  time 
period t. The remainingright-hand-side variables constitute the  zivector. Given employ- 
ment and the criteria to qualify for welfare benefits, welfare demands depend upon demo- 
graphics, including population, foreign-born population, and age distribution. Population 
(POP,,), the  percentage of foreign-born individuals (immigrants)  in county i (FOR,), the 
percentage of families with children under six years of age (CHILD,), the percentage of 
households with elderly members (over age 65) (ELD,), the policy variable (PD,), and 
other  variables (DQ2,,  DQ3,, DQ4,, SJV;,  MWt ,  and HSD,)  are  as  defined in equation (3). 
The assumptions related to the disturbances in the model (Kmenta, p. 622) are as 
follows: 
(5)  E(E&)  = ukii  (k  = 1,2)  (heteroskedasticity), 
E(ekpkii)  = ukti  (mutual correlation), 
Ekli  = P.E.  r  kt,,-1 
+
 Ukit  (autoregression), 
E(Eki,t-l~kir)  = 0, 
E(ukitukjt)  = 
E(ukitukjt)  = 0  (t  # s), 
Okii  = @kiil(l  - P:)  (k = 1,  2), 
Okij  = @  - j)  (k = 1,  21, 
Ukit -N(O, @kij), 
i,j=1,2  ,...,  N  and  t=1,2  ,..., T. 
'  Agriculture accounts for more than 25%  of employment in the Central Valley of California (Kuminoff  and  Sumner). Green, Martin, and Taylor  Welfare  Reform in Agricultural California  177 
Table 1. Definitions of Variables and Expected Signs of Model Coefficients 
Employment  Welfare 
Variable Name  Variable Description  Equation  Equation 
TLF  Total labor force (10,000 persons)  -  NA " 
HSD  High school dropout rate (%)  -  + 
DQ2  Seasonal dummy for Quarter 2, spring  +  ? 
DQ3  Seasonal dummy for Quarter 3, summer  +  ? 
DQ4  Seasonal dummy for Quarter 4, fall  +  ? 
SJV  Dummy for San Joaquin Valley  -  + 
PD  Policy dummy for CalWORKS  +  - 
MCY  Minimum  wage ($/hour)  -  ? 
APP  Apprehensions (10,000 persons)  +  NA 
EMP (E)  Employment rate (%)  NA  - 
POP  Population (10,000 persons)  +  + 
FOR  Foreign-born (immigrants) (%)  -  - 
CHILD  Families wlchildren under 6 years of age (%)  +  + 
ELD  Families wlelderly members over 65 years of age (%)  -  + 
"NA denotes not applicable. 
Recall that E and Win models (3)  and (4) are endogenous variables, and the remaining 
variables are exogenous. The anticipated signs of the coefficients on the variables in the 
employment and welfare equations are summarized in table 1. The key variable in the 
employment equation is the San Joaquin Valley dummy variable (SJV),  which captures 
the employment level in agricultural counties relative to nonagricultural counties. A 
negative sign on the San Joaquin Valley dummy variable would suggest that agricultural 
counties  with a large farm labor force, other things being equal, have lower employment 
rates than urban counties. A positive sign would indicate the opposite, while an  insig- 
nificant coefficient would imply there is no difference between employment rates in 
agricultural and nonagricultural counties. 
The quarterly dummy variables allow for seasonality effects on employment. Signif- 
icant coefficients would suggest seasonal shifts in employment, and thus wider gaps 
between the number of welfare recipients and the availability of jobs. Ceteris paribus, 
the employment rate is expected to increase in the spring, summer, and fall quarters 
relative to winter, and decrease with the total labor force and the percentage of  high 
school dropouts. We expect the employment rate to decrease as the minimum wage rate 
rises and to increase with the number of  apprehensions. 
The key explanatory  variable in the  welfare equation is the employment rate. Because 
lack of earnings is a major eligibility criterion for cash assistance, a negative sign on the 
employment parameter is predicted; i.e., the number of  adults receiving cash grant 
assistance decreases with employment. The sign of  the population (POP) coefficient is 
likely to be positive. Other things (including unemployment)  being equal, the larger the 
population, the larger the number of  potential candidates for cash grants. Population 
size may also affect welfare indirectly, if there are scale economies in the delivery of 
public assistance. Dependency ratios are expected to increase the number of  welfare 
recipients, which should be reflected in positive coefficients on the percentages of house- 
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(ELD).' Anegative coefficient on the  foreign-born variable (FOR)  in the  welfare equation 
is expected, because PRWORA made most legal immigrants aniving after August 22, 
1996, ineligible for federal cash assistance until they had 40 quarters of U.S. employ- 
ment (10 years) or had become naturalized U.S. citizens (possible after five years). 
The policy dummy variable (PD),  which captures the impact of PRWORA, should be 
negatively associated with the number of adults receiving cash assistance if the policy 
change was effective,  independent of other  variables shaping  welfare demand. A statisti- 
cally significant positive sign on the San  Joaquin Valley (SJV)  dummy coefficient would 
indicate, controlling for employment and other explanatory  variables, agricultural coun- 
ties  have a statistically  distinguishable higher welfare dependence than nonagricultural 
counties. The number of adults receiving cash assistance is expected to increase as  the 
high school dropout rate (HSD) increases. 
Data and  Results 
The data used to estimate the model consist of monthly observations from the 58 
counties in California between January 1990 and June 1999. Due to missing obser- 
vations on some of the variables, the model was estimated with 114 observations from 
each of 50 counties,  giving a total of 5,700 observations. The employment data  are 
monthly estimates of the number of employed persons by county. The total labor force 
is the sum of civilian employment and civilian underemployment, or total labor supply, 
available m~nthly.~  The  welfare data include the  number of adults receiving cash assist- 
ance each month, by county, and the data on foreign-born and total population, as  well 
as families with members under age six and over age 65 (dependency measures), taken 
from the 1990 decennial Census of  the Pop~lation.'~  The apprehension data are annual, 
from the Statistical Yearbook of  the Immigration and  Naturalization Service.'' 
All variables were scaled to lie between zero and 100 to eliminate or reduce rounding 
errors in the estimation. Adults receiving cash assistance (W)  is expressed in hundreds 
of persons, and the  total labor force (TLF), apprehensions (APP),  and population (POP) 
are expressed in tens of thousands of persons. Employment rate, high school dropout 
rate, foreign born, families with children under six, and families with elderly members 
are  expressed in percentage rates oftheir  respective bases. Minimum wages are  expressed 
in dollars per hour. The remaining variables are dummy variables that take on values 
of one and zero. 
In  order to  obtain consistent and asymptotically efficient estimators of the  param- 
eters, a cross-sectionally correlated and timewise autoregressive model was developed 
(Kmenta, pp. 622-25). An iterative estimation procedure was used which is equivalent 
Among cash welfare recipients in California in 2000,44% were Hispanic, 25%  were white, 21% were African-American, 
and 10% were Asians and others (Nyberg).  In  many Latino households receiving cash assistance, there are elderly parents 
who do not qualify for Social Security or Supplemental  Security  Income payments. This is  why we expect more elderly house- 
hold members to be associated with more welfare cases. 
These data are available from the California Employment Development Department (accessed online at www.calmis. 
cahwnet.gov0. 
lo  The welfare data used are the number of persons receiving cash assistance each month by county, the 237 data (online 
at  http://migration.ucdavis.eddrhr/data/237.h);  the 1990CensusofthePopulation data, the startingperiodfor the analysis, 
are not online, but are published by the U.S. Department of Commerc&ureau  of the Census. 
"  These are U.S. Border Patrol apprehension  data for the entire 2,000-mile Mexico-U.S. border, and are online at http:// 
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Table 2. Summary Statistics of Unscaled Variables in Model 
Variable 
Unit of  Frequency  County  Standard 
Measure  of Observ.  Level  Mean  Deviation 
Endogenous Variables: 
Employment rate, E (EMP) 
Adults receiving cash assistance (W) 
Exogenous Variables: 
Total labor force (TLF) 
High school dropout rate (HSD) 
Minimum  wage (MW) 
Apprehensions (APP) 
Population (POP) 
Foreign born (FOR) 
Families wlchildren < 6 (CHILD) 





















Note: Sample size = 5,700 observations from 50 counties (114 monthly observations each) from January 1990 
through June 1999. 
to full-information maximum-likelihood  estimation (Oberhofer  and Kmenta; Greene,  pp. 
622-79;  and Kmenta, pp. 618-22).  The model was estimated using SHAZAM, version 
9.0, on stacked data, so that the model could be estimated with the pooled cross-section 
and time-series routine. We also estimated a cross-sectionally heteroskedastic and time- 
wise autoregressive model and scaled the data by county population in order to reduce 
heteroskedasticity, which generated results similar to the  full cross-sectionally  correlated 
and timewise autoregressive model. In addition, it should be noted that the triangular 
system has an  endogenous variable, employment, which appears on the  right-hand side 
of the welfare equation, and the variance-covariance matrix of the error vector is not 
diagonal. However, iterative generalized least squares estimation of the entire system 
is both consistent and efficient (see, e.g., Greene, p. 679). 
The summary statistics for the variables used in the analysis are reported in table 2, 
and the  results of the  pooled cross-section time-series estimations are  presented in  table 
3. The model fits the  data  very well: Buse's R2  for the  overall model is 0.840 (table 3). 
These results are  reported with the  autoregressive coefficients unrestricted across cross- 
sections. The autoregressive coefficients  ranged from 0.61 to 0.99, and most were in the 
0.90-0.99  interval. 
As observed from table 3, the results confirm that employment is significantly lower 
and, controlling for employment, welfare demand is higher in California's major agricul- 
tural counties relative to their nonagricultural counterparts. Other things (including 
seasonality) held constant, the San Joaquin Valley dummy variable has a statistically 
significant and  large negative effect on the  employment rate (- 1.50, t-ratio = 14.15).  The 
effect of this variable on welfare is also statistically significant and large. Controlling 
for employment rate and other variables in the welfare equation, the expected number 
of adult cash welfare recipients is 421 more in agricultural counties of the San  Joaquin 
Valley than  in  the  other California counties (t-ratio = 3.53). This finding indicates there 
is significantly more dependence on cash assistance in San  Joaquin counties regardless 
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Table 3. Iterative Generalized  Least Squares (GLS) Estimates of Employment 
and Welfare Models 
Employment (E)  Equation  Welfare (W) Equation 
















Buse's R2  for model = 0.840 
Log likelihood  =  -43,869.5 
Sample size  = 5,700 
PRWORA reduced the number of  adults receiving cash assistance; however, control- 
ling for employment and other variables, the estimated effect of the policy change is not 
large. The estimated coefficient on the welfare reform dummy (PD),  equal to 1  two years 
prior to when the CalWORKS program went into effect in January 1998, is -0.211, indi- 
cating welfare reform reduced the number of adults receiving cash assistance by about 
21 persons per county per month. The employment rate, ceteris paribus, increases by 
0.7 after welfare reform, most likely reflecting generalized improvements in labor mar- 
kets in the later years of the time series. The finding of a small effect of the policy change 
on the number of  welfare recipients, other things being equal, suggests these reforms 
had little success in moving able-bodied adults from welfare into employment. 
As expected, the number of adults receiving cash assistance decreases as the employ- 
ment rate increases, other things being equal. The coefficient on the employment rate 
variable in the welfare equation is -6.91 and highly statistically significant (table 3). A 
one percentage point increase in the employment rate decreases the number of adults 
receiving cash assistance by about 691  persons (based  on a county mean of 25,239 adults 
receiving cash assistance; table 2). The negative coefficients on DQ3 and DQ4 reflect the 
fact that employment in San Joaquin Valley counties peaks in the third quarter, and in 
the fourth quarter many SJV residents return to Mexico, making them ineligible for 
cash assistance. 
The remaining coefficient estimates generally conform to a priori expectations (table 
3). A higher percentage of  high school dropouts is associated with lower employment 
rates and a higher number of adults receiving cash assistance. Employment rates 
are significantly higher in spring, summer, and fall than in the default winter period. Green, Martin, and Taylor  Welfae  Reform in Agricultural California  18 1 
Coefficients on the six seasonality dummies (three in each equation), although small in 
magnitude, are  all positive and significantly different from zero in the employment 
equation, indicating  higher employment  levels in the  peak spring,  summer, and  fall 
quarters  than  in  the  (default)  winter period. Conversely, coefficients  on the  summer and 
fall dummies are  negative in  the  welfare equation. A likelihood-ratio test for joint sig- 
nificance of the six seasonality coefficients in both equations was highly significant 
(xi,  = 111.2). 
As expected, variables representing dependency rates, the percentage of households 
with elderly members (ELD) and children (CHILD),  are  positively associated with both 
welfare and employment rates, except for the elderly rate in the employment equation, 
which is negative. Increases in the minimum wage are negatively associated with the 
employment rate. The estimated minimum wage (MW)  coefficient is -  1.237 with a t-value 
of 9.23, consistent with a negative impact of wages on labor demand. Increases in the 
minimum wage also increase the  number of adults receiving cash assistance (estimated 
coefficient of 0.110 with a t-ratio of 10.13), implying that, if the minimum wage increases 
by $1  per hour, about 11 adults more per county per month receive cash assistance. The 
total number of adults receiving cash assistance is positively related to county population 
(POP),  and it  is  unexpectedly positively related to the  number of foreign-born residents 
(FOR), a finding which might suggest immigrants depress wages and encourage those 
eligible to seek welfare benefits. 
Conclusions 
The empirical results reported in this study support the hypothesis that agricultural 
counties have both higher unemployment rates and higher welfare dependency rates 
than nonagricultural counties. Welfare policy changes designed to limit the eligibility 
of immigrants for welfare benefits and limit the time one can receive welfare assistance 
promise to add significantly to the supply of  labor in agricultural areas, where em- 
ployment opportunities are most scarce and seasonal. These findings cast doubt on the 
validity of a "one-size-fits-all"  approach to welfare reform and suggest that programs to 
facilitate adjustment of welfare reforms may be needed in agricultural counties. 
Precedents for such adjustment assistance exist. When sector-targeted federal policy 
changes such as  environmental regulations have reduced forestry or fishery employ- 
ment, transitional transfers, unemployment insurance payments, or economic devel- 
opment assistance sometimes have been provided to ameliorate impacts on wages 
or unemployment. 
Welfare reform's effects are more generalized than these sector-focused federal 
adjustment policies; they add to the labor supply in all U.S. counties. However, the 
econometric findings reported here indicate welfare reform is likely to be less effective 
at  moving people into the work force in rural and agricultural counties because, other 
things being equal, these counties have higher-than-average numbers of  adults 
receiving assistance, significantly lower employment rates, and greater seasonality 
than other counties. Thus, welfare-to-work programs in major agricultural areas such 
as the San Joaquin Valley need to be linked closely to strategies aimed at  creating 
jobs which will offer adult recipients earnings and benefits equivalent to the value of 
their welfare benefits. Specifically,  economic development should be an integral part of 
welfare reform. 182  April 2003  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
The alternative to creating jobs where welfare recipients live is to encourage these 
individuals by assisting them in moving to where the  jobs are. The More Opportunities 
for Viable Employment (MOVE) project, spearheaded by the Tulare County Office of 
Education, relocated 600 Tulare residents outside the county over a 14-month period 
between 1998 and 1999, an average of  43 individuals each month. About half were 
welfare recipients. In an ironic reversal of  the 1930s migration from the Midwest to 
California dramatized in John Steinbeck's 1939  novel, The Grapes of Wrath,  most of these 
people left for meatpacking jobs in the Midwest that paid between $7 and $8 an hour. 
Geographic mobility is  the alternative to adjusting to welfare reform within California's 
rural and agricultural counties. 
[Received  December 2001;final revision received December 2002.1 
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